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UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE THROUGH DUE PROCESS 
Abstract: The public trust doctrine (“PTD”) could be a powerful tool for envi-
ronmental lawyers. It protects the public’s right to use and access resources by 
placing them in trust with the state and guiding the sovereign’s discretion in their 
management. Although it lies inherent in sovereignty, the law scatters it across 
constitutional, statutory, and common law sources, hurting its effectiveness. Un-
derstanding the public’s beneficiary interest in this public trust as a due process 
protected property right would help resolve these failings by placing it under the 
umbrella of the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee against arbitrary deprivations of 
“life, liberty, or property.” The enduring history of the doctrine suggests that 
members of the public can reasonably expect the sovereign to respect its trustee 
obligations, giving them a protected interest. The similarity between the PTD and 
the police power lends further support. Understanding the PTD as protected by 
due process would accord with existing PTD precedent and clarify the doctrine’s 
application in the future, allowing it to become the bedrock of environmental law 
that it could be. 
INTRODUCTION 
The archives at the Library of Congress can reveal some interesting 
quirks about the progression of American jurisprudence, particularly unofficial 
remarks by the Supreme Court justices that never made it into the reported 
texts.1 For example, the Blackmun papers reveal that the 1986 case Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission involved more than the published opinions 
suggest, including an otherwise hidden discussion of the public trust doctrine 
(“PTD”)—a doctrine that promotes the public’s interest in certain essential 
resources against private exploitation by naming the sovereign as trustee of 
those resources.2 Nollan presented the issue of permitting exactions in land use 
                                                                                                                           
 1 E.g., William Brennan, Associate Supreme Court Justice, First Draft Dissent for Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n (June 3, 1987) (available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Con-
gress in the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 481) (using the public trust doctrine (“PTD”) as a foun-
dation for upholding an agency decision to require a public access easement along the beach in a con-
struction permit). 
 2 See 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14; see also Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 
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law to the United States Supreme Court for the first time.3 A landowner sought 
a permit to replace his small, shorefront house with a significantly larger 
house.4 The Commission agreed to issue the permit if the landowner agreed to 
grant a public access easement below his seawall, allowing the public to move 
between the beaches a distance to the right and left of his property.5 In review-
ing this condition, the Court ultimately held that such exactions require an es-
sential nexus between the requested condition and the public purpose protected 
by the permit.6 The Court did not find a rational connection between the 
Commission’s stated purpose—visibility of the beach—and a public access 
easement, so it invalidated the condition.7 
Even though the Court seemingly resolved the case on substantive due 
process rationality grounds, the published majority opinion by Justice Antonin 
Scalia painted the exaction as a deprivation of property by describing the situa-
tion as a “takings” and analogizing to per se regulatory takings cases.8 This 
had the unfortunate effect of entangling the exactions context with takings ju-
risprudence.9 In dissent, Justice William Brennan attacked the scrutiny Justice 
Scalia seemed to apply in his “essential nexus” analysis and maintained, in-
stead, that the Court should give greater deference to the state agency in its 
attempts to protect use of such an important resource.10 Justice Harry 
Blackmun also dissented, adding the seemingly unprompted comment that the 
case does not invoke the PTD.11 
The Blackmun papers reveal, however, that Justice Brennan originally 
drafted a much longer dissent.12 The omitted pages discussed the PTD in 
length, including its history and development, its persistence in common law, 
the obligations it placed on the states as trustees, the limitations it placed on 
private holders of trust resources, and the mitigating effect that it had on the 
                                                                                                                           
10,637, 10,653–54 (2005) (describing correspondence, draft opinions, and other documents available 
in the Blackmun papers relating to environmental law). 
 3 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. 
 4 Id. at 828. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 837. 
 7 Id. at 838–39. 
 8 Id. at 831, 837 (discussing Loretto v. Telepromter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
(a per se regulatory takings case) and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (a case with 
subsequent negative treatment for confounding due process and takings analysis)); see Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring the “Arbi-
trary and Capricious” Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661, 709 (1989) (discussing rational-basis due process review). 
 9 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 837 (relying on takings case law to portray the proffered condition 
as extortionate); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (attempting to 
distinguish takings and due process analysis but leaving exactions analysis unchanged). 
 10 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 11 Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 12 Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14. 
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deprivation in this case.13 Justice Blackmun, though, suggested that Justice 
Brennan remove the PTD discussion out of concern that publishing such an 
exposition in dissent would associate the PTD with invalidated law and that 
Justice Scalia may expressly undermine the doctrine in his majority opinion.14 
A back and forth of drafts proceeded between justices Brennan and Scalia, but, 
as the published opinions make evident, in the end the PTD fell out of the 
case.15 The short, precautionary statement that Justice Blackmun inserted into 
his dissent remains as the only official reference in the case.16 
Justice Brennan’s unpublished opinion invoked a classic formulation of 
the PTD that numerous federal and state courts have transcribed and applied.17 
Like most similarly longstanding doctrines, much of the debate surrounding 
the PTD involves its application at the fringes of its scope.18 Unlike most other 
doctrines, though, its source remains hazy.19 Some scholars argue for a single 
source in federal law—either in federal common law or in the U.S. Constitu-
tion through the Commerce Clause, Property Clause, or from reserved-powers 
implicit in the Tenth Amendment.20 Others maintain that it exists entirely as a 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. 
 14 Ellen Deason, Law Clerk, Memorandum to Justice Blackmun on Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n (June 9, 1987) (available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in the 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 481). 
 15 Ellen Deason, Law Clerk, Memorandum to Justice Blackmun on Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n (June 25, 1987) (available through the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in the 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 481); see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825–64. 
 16 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (mentioning the PTD briefly to explicit-
ly remove it from the majority’s holding). 
 17 Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14 (referring to the PTD as outlined in Ill. Cent., Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (setting American jurisprudence’s preeminent description of the 
PTD)); see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classi-
fications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2007) 
[hereinafter Eastern Public Trust] (saying that the leading connotation of the PTD is that described in 
Illinois Central). 
 18 See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Ride’em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 72 (2007) (arguing for application of the PTD to the 
United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone to regulate fish ranching); Eastern Public Trust, supra note 
17, at 21–24 (describing states that expand the PTD to meet changing public needs); Robin Kundis 
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western State’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Values, Private 
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 53, 71–72 (2010) 
[hereinafter Western State’s Public Trust] (describing expansion of the PTD to fit the needs of indi-
vidual states); Jeffrey Thaler & Patrick Lyons, The Seas Are Changing: It’s Time to Use Ocean-Based 
Renewable Energy, the Public Trust Doctrine, and a Green Thumb to Protect Seas from Our Chang-
ing Climate, 19 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 241, 257 (2014) (arguing to use the PTD to promote ocean-
based renewable energy). 
 19 William Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine: 30 Years Later: The Public Trust Doctrine as an 
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 697 (2012). 
 20 See Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpret-
ing Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 412 (2015) (arguing that the 
PTD comes from the powers reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment); Chrystal C. Chase, 
The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 
1324 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1321 
matter of state law and thus actually has fifty-one independent sources—the 
individual states and the federal government.21 If the PTD stood on firmer 
ground, Justice Brennan may not have dropped the PTD argument from his 
Nollan dissent, and exactions may not have stumbled into takings jurispru-
dence.22 
The discord that surrounds the PTD, which inhibited the Court from rely-
ing on it to resolve Nollan, stands in stark juxtaposition to the doctrine’s wide-
ly accepted ancient heritage.23 This ancient heritage, however, suggests an al-
ternative view of the doctrine, one that would embed it in the U.S. Constitution 
and many state constitutions and make it applicable to all sovereigns within the 
United States.24 Understanding the PTD in trust terms, its heritage paints the 
beneficiary interest in the public—present and future—as a fundamental right 
                                                                                                                           
HASTINGS W-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 141 (2010) (arguing that the PTD comes from federal 
common law); Thaler & Lyons, supra note 18, at 287 (suggesting that the PTD could derive from the 
Commerce Clause or Property Clause). 
 21 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 402 (calling it a mistake to consider the PTD purely a 
matter of state law); Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 3 (calling it a mistake to reduce the fifty 
state PTDs into a single doctrine). The amount of literature contributing to the debate as to the exist-
ence of a PTD applicable to the federal government has increased as the physical, domestic, and inter-
national political climates change. E.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Poten-
tial Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 796–97 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Adapting to Climate Change] (arguing for use of the PTD to help water resources law adapt to 
climate change); Thaler & Lyons, supra note 18, at 257 (arguing for use of a federal PTD to develop 
renewable energy sources to combat climate change); Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary 
of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the 
Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6–8 (2009) (arguing for use of a federal 
PTD to help regulation of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone respond to climate change). Several 
cases imply that the federal government has PTD obligations, but because many federal statutes in-
clude trust language that reflect the common law PTD, courts have not yet applied the common law 
doctrine to federal public lands. Babcock, supra note 18, at 57; see, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres 
of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Mass. 1981) (stating that the federal government has public trust 
obligations); In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that 
the state and federal government have an obligation to protect wildlife resources). Dicta from several 
United States Supreme Court cases have further stoked the controversy. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Mon-
tana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012) (“the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law”); Idaho v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997) (saying Illinois Central was “necessarily a statement 
of Illinois law” (quoting Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926)). But see Blumm & 
Schaffer, supra note 20, at 409 (arguing that these cases do not support the conclusion that there is no 
federal PTD). 
 22 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 837 (relying on takings precedent to analyze permitting exactions); see 
id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (omitting any discussion of the PTD); Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–
14 (relying on the PTD to show the rationality of government action). 
 23 See, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic 
Property Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 801 (1979) (describing res com-
munes in Roman and English law); Charles F. Wilkins, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 (1989) (de-
scribing the ancient roots of the PTD around the world). 
 24 See Coquillette, supra note 23, at 801 (describing the PTD’s heritage); Wilkins, supra note 23, 
at 429 (same). 
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in property that due process should protect.25 No court has explicitly described 
it as such, but viewing the PTD in this light accords with its judicial treatment 
thus far, clarifies it as a useful doctrine moving forwards, and guides the ongo-
ing debate in each sovereign over the corpus of its trust.26 A due process PTD 
would also likely have given the dissenting justices in Nollan confidence 
enough to use the doctrine in opposing the questionable majority opinion.27 
This note argues that courts and practitioners should treat the PTD as an 
element of due process, and proceeds in five parts.28 Part I summarizes due 
process and the protections it offers; Part II presents an overview of the PTD 
and its tradition; Part III outlines incorporation of the PTD into American law; 
Part IV explains why the PTD fits within due process; and finally, Part V dis-
cusses how judicial treatment of the PTD would proceed under due process.29 
I. DUE PROCESS: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
Analogous to the PTD, the concept of due process has ancient roots that 
spread throughout the American legal system.30 Its understanding in that sys-
tem stems from the thirteenth century and chapter thirty-nine of the Magna 
Carta.31 Chapter thirty-nine made the sovereign power of the monarch subject 
to the “law of the land.”32 Over a century later, documents describing this limi-
tation began to interchange the phrase “due process” as a synonym for “law of 
the land.”33 Together these phrases required the sovereign to recognize the 
                                                                                                                           
 25 James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive 
Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 327 (1999); see infra notes 156–175 and accompanying text 
(describing the PTD beneficiary interest as a protected property right). 
 26 See infra notes 195–266 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 253–257 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 30–267 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 30–65 and accompanying text (Part I); infra notes 66–98 and accompanying 
text (Part II); infra notes 99–153 and accompanying text (Part III); infra notes 154–211 and accompa-
nying text (Part IV); infra notes 212–267 and accompanying text (Part V). 
 30 See Ely, supra note 25, at 324 (describing the origins of due process in the Magna Carta); Wil-
kins, supra note 23, at 429 (describing the history of the PTD). 
 31 Ely, supra note 25, at 321, 324. 
 32 Id. at 320, 324. 
 33 Id. at 320–21. This synonymous use continued through the founding of the United States, with 
several early federal documents and several state constitutions opting to use “law of the land” rather 
than “due process.” E.g., Northwest Ordinance, ch.8, 1 Stat. 50, art. 2 (1787) (declaring “no man shall 
be deprived of his liberty or property but by . . . the law of the land”); MD. CONST. art. XXI (1776), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp#1 [https://perma.cc/UF8P-BJNY] (declaring, “no 
free man ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but . . . by the law of the land”); 
N.C. CONST. art. XII (1776), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp [https://perma.cc/
XQ5L-KL7T] (declaring, “no free man ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by 
the law of the land”). All states now offer this protection from one source or another. E.g., U.S. 
CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1 (stating no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law”); MASS. CONST. art. X (stating, “[e]very individual of the society has a right to be 
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws”); N.Y. 
1326 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1321 
fundamental rights of the people and restrained arbitrary governance.34 The 
United States Supreme Court in its first interpretation of the Fifth Amendment 
confirmed this notion, saying that the phrase “due process” conveyed the same 
meaning as the phrase “law of the land” as used in the Magna Carta six and a 
half centuries earlier.35 
The idea that certain rights of the people—rights based in reason and nat-
ural law36—predate the establishment of government and are immune from 
regulation except for the broader public good, spoke directly to the revolution-
ary spirit of the Framers.37 Accordingly, many of the early state constitutions 
and the U.S. Constitution explicitly included due process, law of the land, or 
analogous clauses.38 
From its start, due process and its synonymous phrases have placed both 
procedural and substantive requirements on government.39 Procedural due pro-
                                                                                                                           
CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (stating, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, 
or property, but by the law of the land”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (stating, “no person shall be deprived 
of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law”). 
 34 Ely, supra note 25, at 320, 327. 
 35 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856); 
Ely, supra note 25, at 328. 
 36 Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 
AM. U. L. REV. 351, 381 (1997). Many today abhor resort to natural law, but that does not change the 
fact that the Framers largely accepted the restraints of natural law and that the Constitution embodies 
many natural law principles, particularly relevant here, Article IV, § 2, the Fifth Amendment, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 702 (arguing that a natural law view of the PTD 
goes against modern positivist legal thinking); George P. Smith II & Michael Sweeney, The Public 
Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 
316 (2006) (arguing that natural law remains an essential part of constitutional interpretation because 
of its impact on the Framers). 
 37 See Ely, supra note 25, at 324 (saying America returned to the concepts of fundamental rights 
embodied in the Magna Carta upon independence); Smith, supra note 36, at 381 (saying that belief in 
fundamental civil rights were abundant when the Constitution was ratified). The writings of John 
Locke, which highly influenced the Framers, painted the sovereign as a political body that was grant-
ed limited powers through consent of the people to serve certain purposes. John Hilla, The Library 
Effect of Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 77, 97, 99 (2008). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. V; MD. CONST. art. XXI (1776), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/
ma02.asp#1 [https://perma.cc/UF8P-BJNY] (declaring, “no free man ought to be . . . deprived of his 
life, liberty, or property, but . . . by the law of the land”); Ely, supra note 25, at 324. James Madison 
opted for the phrase “due process,” but he most likely intended the traditional meaning of the phrase. 
Ely, supra note 25, at 325. 
 39 Ely, supra note 25, at 321. Some criticize substantive due process as an oxymoron or as a tool 
for judicial activism. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39, (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (saying 
“[i]f I thought that ‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I 
would think it violated by bait-and-switch taxation”); Ely, supra note 25, at 315. But irrespective of its 
merits, due process has long placed substantive limits on government. See Ely, supra note 25, at 315–
16 (highlighting the growth, trimming, and reemergence of substantive due process through time). 
Moreover, rather than being doctrinal in and of itself, the phrase “substantive due process” actually 
originated in twentieth century legal textbooks and derived from commenters who saw it as politically 
conservative judicial activism. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 256 
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cess guarantees a measure of judicial or adjudicative procedure prior to depri-
vation of protected interests.40 Substantive due process, contrarily, limits law-
making and guards against arbitrary or irrational government intrusions into 
protected rights.41 As such, it serves as one of the primary checks on state ex-
ercise of the police power.42 
Judicial review of substantive due process’s protections against arbitrary 
or capricious government action considers why the governing body chose to 
act and how it chose to do so.43 A proper public purpose, such as serving the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, justifies the government tak-
ing action in most circumstances.44 Actions that infringe particularly important 
rights require a more compelling public interest.45 If the purpose satisfies the 
court, the court then looks to the rationality of the means chosen to serve that 
end.46 Generally, this only involves a deferential review for a reasonable rela-
tionship, but, when fundamental rights are at stake, it may involve a deeper 
inquiry into the least restrictive means.47 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the 
                                                                                                                           
(2000); Ely, supra note 25, at 319; see Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (using the phrase “substantive due process” for the first time in a Supreme 
Court opinion). 
 40 Mathews v. Edlridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). The United States Supreme Court articu-
lated its test for adequate process in Mathews, saying that to determine due process the court should 
balance the private interests at stake, the relative risk of error for the procedure considered, and the 
government interests. Id. at 335. 
 41 See City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (explaining that the Court has al-
ways understood the core of due process “to be protection against arbitrary action”); Ely, supra note 
25, at 327. 
 42 See Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934) (explaining that an act 
of the police power limiting private contracts might not violate the due process or contract clauses); 
infra notes 43–55 and accompanying text (explaining substantive due process rationality review). 
Some commenters restrict the term police power to only those actions meant to serve public health 
and safety, but this Note uses the more common meaning, referring to the entire gambit of sovereign 
powers reserved by the state after its grants to the federal government. See Christopher Supino, The 
Police Power and “Public Use”: Balancing the Public Interest Against Private Rights Through Prin-
cipled Constitutional Distinctions, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 711, 724 (2008). Lord Hale defined the sover-
eign power as encompassing the police power but limited by public law. Donna Jalbert Patalano, 
Note, Police Power and the Public Trust: Perspective Zoning through the Conflation of Two Ancient 
Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 683, 705 (2001). 
 43 Plater & Norine, supra note 8, at 709. Other categories of substantive due process protection 
include protection against ultra vires action and against unduly burdensome action. See id. at 707–11. 
 44 See Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (finding that promoting public health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare is a legitimate public purpose). 
 45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–
28 (1969). 
 46 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (deferentially considering the 
means chosen to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting women in the workplace). 
 47 Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (requiring a narrowly tailored means, a form of strict scrutiny 
inquiry) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (requiring that means only be as 
broad as necessary, a form of strict scrutiny analysis), with W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399 (requiring 
only that means not be arbitrary or capricious, an articulation of rational-basis inquiry). 
1328 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1321 
Supreme Court explicitly identified such rationality-review as a matter of due 
process.48 In that case, the Court sought to remedy confusion in takings juris-
prudence caused by Agins v. City of Tiburon, which articulated the “substan-
tially advances a legitimate state interest” test.49 The Lingle Court specified 
that this rationality-based test served due process rather than takings.50 
Providing substantive due process generally does not pose much of a 
challenge to legislatures and agencies due to the deference courts tend to give 
the coequal branches.51 At least in the area of land use, when reviewing for 
proper public purpose, courts only look to see if the law serves the judicially 
described bounds of the police power.52 For example in Euclid v. Ambler the 
Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of zoning regulations after deciding 
that the restriction of property rights served public health, safety, and general 
welfare.53 Showing rationality, likewise, only requires that the record demon-
strate a reasoned connection between the means used and ends desired.54 In 
Agins, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the city’s choice to limit a 
landowner’s ability to subdivide his property because the decision “substantial-
ly advanced” the legitimate public purpose of preserving open spaces and pre-
venting urban sprawl.55 
Due process issues primarily arise when exercises of a sovereign’s power, 
often in service of public law, conflict with private interests.56 The Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments describe these protected private interests categorically 
as “life, liberty, and property.”57 Thus, land use regulation can raise due pro-
                                                                                                                           
 48 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). 
 49 Id.; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
 50 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. The jurisprudence surrounding the growth of public utilities before the 
New Deal expansion of the administrative state also helps demonstrate the substantive protections of 
due process. E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (describing the ability of states in 
compliance with due process to curtail private property rights through the police power if the limita-
tion is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and relates to the public welfare). 
 51 See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399 (indicating courts should defer to legislative policy judg-
ments, even if potentially unwise). 
 52 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (upholding zoning regulations provided they have a substantial 
relation to a proper public purpose). The Euclid Court gave an enduring statement of proper purposes 
for exercise of the police power, namely those that “substantially relate to public health, safety, mor-
als, or general welfare.” Id. 
 53 Id. at 389–90, 395. 
 54 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (finding a regula-
tion limiting opticians to operate only under prescriptions as a reasonable means of freeing the profes-
sion from commercialism); W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398 (finding a minimum wage law for women 
and minors a reasonable means of promoting health and safety). 
 55 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. Decades later in Lingle, the Court clarified that this reasoning spoke to 
due process not takings analysis. 544 U.S. at 540. 
 56 E.g., W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 (discussing a possible conflict between state law and the 
right to contract); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384 (discussing a possible conflict between state law and the 
free use of property). 
 57 U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1. 
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cess concerns because it affects interests in real property.58 Other clauses of the 
Constitution shed some light on the meaning of these categories, but they have 
taken shape largely through the common law process and outside the realm of 
land use and real and private property law.59 
Central to understanding the PTD, courts have identified property inter-
ests beyond private real and personal property that warrants due process 
through entitlement theory.60 Essentially, entitlement theory says that a pro-
tected interest exists where antecedent sources of law limit governing discre-
tion towards a particular right to the effect that a person can reasonably expect 
a certain outcome or have legitimate expectations as to its treatment.61 Courts 
have applied this same reasoning to extend due process protection to liberty 
interests created by regulation.62 In that context, courts look for the text of the 
regulation to contain directives guiding the administrator’s exercise of discre-
tion, ideally expressed by explicit language mandating a particular outcome 
should certain triggering criteria be met.63 This language reinforces the princi-
ple that property and liberty interests, though protected by the Constitution, do 
not come from the Constitution.64 Instead, due process protected interests de-
rive from preexisting notions of the law.65 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384 (considering the constitutionality of zoning regulations that 
limit private property rights). 
 59 E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, V, VI (providing for the freedom of speech and religion; free-
dom from unconsented quarter and taking of private property without just compensation; and rights 
prior to criminal punishment); see Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) 
(saying that property interests come from existing, independent sources of law rather than the Consti-
tution). Fundamental liberty interests, including the right to marry and reproduce, have also emerged 
through the common law process, particularly where the Court has found the rights engrained in the 
nation’s history and tradition or essential to the pursuit of happiness. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967) (finding that freedom to marry is essential to the pursuit of happiness); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that the right to procreate is fundamental to the survival of 
the species); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing liberty as the freedom to par-
take in activities “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”). 
 60 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (stating that a recipient’s interest in welfare 
benefits is protected by due process); Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“[c]ollectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible”). 
 61 See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (finding that failure to 
expediently enforce a restraining order was not deprivation of a reasonably expected property inter-
est); Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 (finding that an employee was not entitled to renewal of his contract, so it 
was not a property interest). 
 62 See Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1989) (reviewing whether sub-
stantive limitations on official discretion created liberty interests for prisoners). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see Ky. Dep’t of Corrs., 490 U.S. at 462–63 (saying that the Court will 
look for mandatory language limiting discretion to identify liberty interests). 
 65 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
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II. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
The PTD affirms the value society holds in certain resources and requires 
that government distinguish these resources under law from other forms of real 
or personal property.66 These resources comprise the corpus of a trust managed 
by the sovereign as trustee for its people—present and future—as beneficiar-
ies.67 The traditional PTD identifies navigable waters, tidal waters, submerged 
lands, and riverbanks necessary for access as the trust resources; however, 
some states, recognizing the finite nature and public value of other resources, 
have extended their trust’s corpus.68 Regardless of the scope of resources a 
sovereign protects, the PTD foremost protects the intergenerational public in-
terest in access and use of those resources.69 
In recognizing the evolving public interest, it additionally serves as an an-
ti-monopoly and anti-majoritarian check on resource management.70 Because 
the PTD protects public use and access, it places title in a perennial trust with 
the sovereign as trustee and limits alienation of that control to private parties, 
thus opposing monopolization of the resource.71 Because the PTD operates in 
support of intergenerational interests, it requires legislators and administrators 
to consider both present and future interests, thus hindering the political ca-
price of the sitting majority.72 
The PTD, though, does not require absolute preservation or even absolute 
public access.73 Rather, it demands that any regulation, conservation, or aliena-
tion of trust resources serves the public’s beneficiary interest.74 From this per-
spective, some describe the PTD as protecting administrative or procedural 
rather than substantive interests, requiring regulators to account for the its 
heightened public purpose requirement and design the means of regulation to 
                                                                                                                           
 66 J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Conver-
gence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 916 (2012); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 69 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485 (1970). 
 67 Chase, supra note 20, at 136; Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 17–18. 
 68 Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 831 (discussing expansion of the PTD to in-
clude ecological protection); Western States’ Public Trust, supra note 18, at 71–72 (discussing the 
individualization of state PTDs). 
 69 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (saying the trust obligates govern-
ment to preserve waters for public use). 
 70 See Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 784 (saying the PTD restricts government’s 
ability to undermine public interests and allows democratization of natural resource allocation); Lyn 
S. Schaffer, Note & Comment, Pulled from Thin Air: The (Mis)application of Statutory Displacement 
to a Public Trust Claim in Alec L. v. Jackson, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 190 (2015) (saying 
the PTD protects the public from monopoly control and the interests of a few). 
 71 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; Schaffer, supra note 70, at 190–91. 
 72 Schaffer, supra note 70, at 190–91; see Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 17–18 (describing the 
multi-generation nature of the PTD). 
 73 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 455 (saying government can alienate trust resources in certain cir-
cumstances). 
 74 Id. 
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serve that end.75 Undoubtedly, the PTD does impose such procedural obliga-
tions in practice.76 But, the doctrine’s history reveals that those obligations at-
tend a substantive property right.77 
Sovereigns around the world recognize a restraint on their authority akin 
to the PTD.78 The American PTD, specifically, traces its origins back through 
English common law to Roman law, particularly Book II of the Justinian Insti-
tutes.79 The Romans classified and applied law differently based on its source, 
similar to how the American legal system does today.80 Initially, they classified 
law by whom it served, with public law—which protects the welfare of the 
state—outweighing private law—which protects individual interests—when in 
conflict.81 In regards to private law, the Romans acknowledged the limitations 
set by the irreproachable laws of the physical world, such as gravity and the 
tides, as laws of nature applicable to all.82 They termed the laws that civilized 
societies would generally share, which either augmented or limited private in-
terests, laws of nations and considered them, likewise, applicable to citizens 
and noncitizens alike.83 The Romans termed the final category civil law and 
included in it all the positive laws unique to the state and applicable only to 
citizens.84 
Continuing this systematic approach, according to the Justinian Institutes 
the Romans also divided ‘things’ into multiple discrete categories of property, 
several of which have persisted into modern law.85 Foremost, they distin-
guished property wholly capable of private ownership—private property—and 
property imbued with a public interest and correspondingly incapable of com-
plete private control.86 They recognized five different categories of property 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Coquillette, supra note 23, at 811 (arguing against reducing the PTD to an administrative 
law); Sax, supra note 66, at 490 (describing the PTD as a model of judicial review). 
 76 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P. 2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (holding that 
the state has an affirmative duty to account for trust responsibilities in allocating water resources); 
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n., 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (describing conditions necessary to 
approve diversion of trust property). 
 77 Coquillette, supra note 23, at 811. 
 78 Wilkins, supra note 23, at 429. 
 79 J. INST. 2.1; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 801; Wilkins, supra note 23, at 429. 
 80 Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for 
the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 871 (2007); 
Coquillette, supra note 23, at 800–01. 
 81 J. INST. 1.1.4; Abrams, supra note 80, at 871; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 802–03. 
 82 See J. INST. 1.2, 1.2.11 (describing the law of nature as that governing all animals, not just 
humans, those immutable laws established by providence). 
 83 J. INST. 1.1–.2; Smith, supra note 36, at 366. The term “law of nations” also described a sepa-
rate bank of law governing the relationship between nations, making it the precursor to international 
law. Smith, supra note 36 at 366. 
 84 J. INST. 1.2.1–.2; Smith, supra note 36, at 368. 
 85 J. INST. 2.1.1; Abrams, supra note 80, at 871. 
 86 J. INST. 2.1.1; Abrams, supra note 80, at 871. 
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incapable of exclusive ownership, including sacred property and property be-
longing to societies or corporations.87 The most important of these five catego-
ries for PTD purposes were what the Romans termed res communes and res 
publicae.88 Res communes, or common property, belonged to no one as a mat-
ter of natural law and included “the air, running water, the sea, and consequent-
ly the sea shore.”89 Res publicae, or public property, referred to that property 
which, although possibly capable of exclusive ownership, the public had a 
right to access and use under the law of nations.90 Examples included rivers, 
harbors, and their banks for access and mooring as the public needed.91 
Centuries later, as the medieval period came to its end, scholars and ju-
rists referred to this Roman tradition in shaping what would become English 
common law.92 This early English writing maintained that as a matter of public 
law, the private interests in both common property and public property had to 
yield to that of the public.93 Jurists and scholars of the time described title to 
this property as resting with the sovereign for the benefit of the public, in part 
to establish the authority of the reigning monarchs and to express the emerging 
notion of inalienability of sovereignty.94 They described the sovereign as trus-
tee of the state’s natural resources, with the public law limiting sovereign pow-
er.95 
Some scholars question the practical truth of this description.96 Lord 
Chief Justice Hale, however, propounded it as the state of the law, describing 
title to the soil between the mean high tide and low tide marks as presumptive-
                                                                                                                           
 87 J. INST. 2.1.1; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 802–03. 
 88 See Abrams, supra note 80, at 871 (describing the use of classifications in Roman jurispru-
dence); Coquillette, supra note 23, at 804 (indicating that res publicae and res communes are the pre-
cursors of the PTD). This concept is extremely similar to but not synonymous with the English con-
cept of a commons, land held in trust by the local government for service of the city or town’s citi-
zens. See Coquillette, supra note 23, at 809 nn.229–30 (discussing Massachusetts commons); see also 
United States v. Walker, No. 07-10176-DPW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94666, at 6 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 
2007) (describing the history of the Boston commons). 
 89 J. INST. 2.1.1; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 801–02. 
 90 J. INST. 2.1.2; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 802 n.195. 
 91 J. INST. 2.1.4; Coquillette, supra note 23, at 802 n.195. 
 92 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458 (referring to the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, an influential 
seventeenth century English jurist, that discuss rights over trust resources); Abrams, supra note 80, at 
878 (discussing the PTD at the end of the Middle Ages); Coquillette, supra note 23, at 804 (discussing 
the Roman influence on Henry de Bracton, an influential thirteen century English jurist). 
 93 See Shively v. Bowbly, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894) (discussing the relation of private and public law 
by quoting Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris (1670)); Patalano, supra note 42, at 705 (discussing 
Hale’s interpretation of public and private law). 
 94 Abrams, supra note 80, at 878–79. 
 95 See Coquillette, supra note 23, at 804 (referring to Henry de Bracton, whose writings helped 
preserve Roman categories of property in English common law); Patalano, supra note 42, at 705 (re-
ferring specifically to Sir Matthew Hale, whose writings described the sovereign’s trustee responsi-
bilities). 
 96 Abrams, supra note 80, at 882. 
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ly held by the sovereign.97 Because his writings had a marked influence on the 
forming American States, it follows that American jurisprudence started with 
expansive public ownership of shore lands, a presumption against grant of 
those lands to private ownership, and the imposition of trustee obligations on 
those who hold title.98 
III. INCORPORATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST  
IN AMERICAN LAW 
From the start, the colonies that would go on to become the American 
states assumed the sovereign responsibilities of the monarch and recognized 
the public interest in certain resources, most notably tidal lands.99 The Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony did so explicitly in its ordinance of 1641, amended in 
1647, recognizing the public rights to fish, hunt, and navigate below the high 
water mark.100 The other colonies followed suit recognizing the public interest 
in tidal waters and the sovereign obligation to serve that interest either by ordi-
nance or common law.101 Upon achieving independence, the original states 
adopted this sovereign responsibility, often affirming the public right in the 
face of prior land grants.102 Although their legal concepts of sovereignty and 
property derived from English common law, the states made clear that English 
law did not bind them.103 As such, several states independently moved away 
from the tidal influence test used at common law to identify lands held in trust 
by the sovereign to protect all waters navigable-in-fact in addition to those af-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 882–83. 
 99 Id. at 883, 888. 
 100 Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 629–30 (1998). In 1647, the colony amended this ordinance to allow 
private littoral rights down to the low water mark, restrained only by a guarantee of public access for 
fishing, fowling, and navigation. Id. at 630. The colony did so, however, to serve what it saw as a 
public end, allowing private ownership to promote construction of wharfs to encourage navigation and 
commerce in public water generally. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 89 (1851); Fernandez, 
supra, at 631. Extending this ordinance through common law, Massachusetts and Maine still allow 
private ownership down to the low water mark. Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 15, 62. Other 
states and the United States Supreme Court have endorsed the threshold set by English common law, 
the mean high tide mark or focus on navigability. See id. at 7, 15 (describing the default federal posi-
tion that the state holds all tidally affected lands in trust). 
 101 See Abrams, supra note 80, at 883 (describing extensive public ownership of the foreshore as 
the starting point for American law); Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 4 (describing the PTD of 
eastern states forming before statehood). 
 102 Abrams, supra note 80, at 884–85. The antecedent land grants came from the English sover-
eign and many of those receiving such grants remained loyal to the crown through the revolution, 
which may have added political incentive to invalidate those grants after independence. Id. at 885. 
 103 Id. at 889. 
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fected by the tides.104 The system of duel sovereignty embraced by the emerg-
ing nation, however, meant that the PTD developed at both the federal and 
state levels.105 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in the Federal System 
During the nineteenth century, the PTD grew as one of several related 
doctrines speaking to control of useful waters between the nation’s respective 
sovereigns.106 These include the equal-footing doctrine, which speaks to state 
control, and the navigational servitude, which speaks to federal control.107 Ac-
cordingly, the United States Supreme Court’s first discussion of the PTD oc-
curs in cases focusing on state sovereignty and federalism rather than private 
and public property rights.108 For example, in the 1842 case Martin v. Waddell, 
which focused on the right to harvest oysters from submerged tidal lands, the 
Supreme Court used trust language to describe state held resources for the first 
time.109 In that case, the Court stated that the King had held title to these lands 
in trust for the public, that this responsibility passed to the Duke upon coloni-
zation, and that it subsequently vested in the state upon independence.110 
Pollard v. Hagan, which involved competing claims to the submerged 
lands under an Alabama river, followed just three years later and stands as the 
formative case for the equal-footing doctrine.111 There, the Court invalidated a 
federal land grant to the submerged lands, holding that when Alabama entered 
the union on equal-footing with the original states, all the rights of sovereignty 
passed to it from the ceding sovereign, including title to submerged lands.112 
Through this series of cases, the Court established that the states held title to 
submerged lands.113 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Navigable-in-fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“naturally useable for travel 
or commerce in the present condition”); Abrams, supra note 80, at 890; Adapting to Climate Change, 
supra note 21, at 809–10. The reasons for the United States, a large nation with many landlocked 
states, expanding on the tidal influence test originating in England, a relatively small island, seem 
relatively apparent. Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 809–10. 
 105 See infra notes 106–153. 
 106 Wilkins, supra note 23, at 439. 
 107 Equal-footing doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (all states admitted to the 
union enter with the same rights as the original thirteen, including title to beds and banks of navigable 
waters); Navigation servitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (the federal government 
has an easement over navigable waters allowing it to regulate commerce without paying compensation 
for interference with private rights); Wilkins, supra note 23, at 439. 
 108 E.g., Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411–14 (1842) (discussing the Eng-
lish and colonial basis for shore lands as held in trust by the sovereign). 
 109 Id. at 407. 
 110 Id. at 411, 416. 
 111 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 219 (1845); see Chase, supra note 20, at 121 (describing Pollard as the 
foundation of the equal-footing doctrine). 
 112 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 423. 
 113 Id.; Martin, 41 U.S. at 416. 
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Because the early PTD only focused on tidal and navigable waters and the 
states independently recognized the public’s rights to these lands, the Supreme 
Court actually did not directly address the PTD until 1892 in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.114 In that case, the Court gave what persists as the 
seminal statement of the public trust in navigable and tidal waters and their 
submerged lands, which this Note refers to as the traditional public trust doc-
trine.115 The case arose when the state of Illinois sought to invalidate a grant of 
title in a large portion of Lake Michigan off the Chicago coast by an earlier 
legislature to a private railroad.116 Justice Fields, writing for the majority, built 
on the existing precedent establishing state sovereignty over submerged lands 
to maintain that the state’s title to those lands is “different in character” from 
the title it holds in lands intended for sale.117 He described it as “held in trust 
for the people of the state” to allow the public to use the waters freely for nav-
igation, commerce, and fishing free from impediments or meddling by private 
parties.118 The state could only abdicate control over these resources if doing 
so promoted the interests of the public therein or would not substantially im-
pair the public interest in the remaining lands and waters.119 
Later in his Illinois Central opinion, Justice Fields compared the trust re-
sponsibilities to the police power, saying that “the state can no more abdicate 
its trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can 
abdicate its police powers . . . .”120 He proceeded to describe given grants as 
“necessarily revocable” to allow the state to resume its trust responsibilities 
and to avoid placing the resources at the mercy of the legislature’s majority.121 
Because the PTD barred the state from abdicating control of trust resources as 
wholly as the at-issue grant did, the Court ultimately found the grant invalid.122 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433 (1892); see Eastern Public Trust, supra note 
17, at 4 (describing early adoption of the PTD by the states). 
 115 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452–56; see Sax, supra note 66, at 489 (describing Illinois Central as the 
lodestar of PTD doctrine). Compare this restricted PTD to the more expansive versions of some states. 
See Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 846–50; Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 
11; Western States’ Public Trust, supra note 18, at 83–84. 
 116 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 433. 
 117 Id. at 435, 452. Just a few years later in Geer v. Connecticut, Justice Fields dissented from an 
opinion that reduced animals in the commons to property of the state subject to its police power with-
out becoming articles of commerce subject to the federal government’s control over interstate com-
merce. 161 U.S. 519, 539 (1896). Justice Fields would have held that animals in the commons did not 
become property subject to exclusive control until someone took possession, at which point they be-
came items of commerce. Id. at 539, 541. Neither he nor the majority appeared to endorse exploitation 
of the commons, but he seemed to see the state’s sovereign authority over that property as limited. See 
id. at 539 (allowing private parties to claim exclusive control). 
 118 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452. 
 119 Id. at 453. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 455. 
 122 Id. at 460. 
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The Supreme Court reiterated this position two years later in Shively v. Bowlby, 
quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale extensively and tethering the doctrine more 
explicitly in its English common law heritage.123 
The Court’s pronouncement of the PTD in Illinois Central remained 
largely static over the next century until Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi 
in 1988, when the Supreme Court considered title to non-navigable segments 
of tidal rivers.124 There, the Court held that the expansion of the American 
PTD to include lands submerged under all navigable-in-fact waters did not 
mean an abandonment of the common law tidal influence test.125 Thus, title to 
the disputed tidal lands vested in the state as trustee upon admission to the un-
ion, regardless of navigability.126 
This statement, that the PTD extends to lands submerged under both nav-
igable-in-fact and tidally influenced waters, stands as the Court’s last major 
articulation of the scope of the doctrine.127 Moreover, the Court has comment-
ed only once on the PTD in recent years.128 In 2012, the Court mentioned the 
PTD in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, a dispute over the state’s title to non-
navigable river segments.129 The state of Montana raised the PTD as part of its 
argument for title, so the Court addressed it to highlight the distinction be-
tween the PTD and the doctrine actually controlling the case, the equal-footing 
doctrine.130 Considering this sparse treatment, in terms of Supreme Court prec-
edent, the descriptions of the PTD by Justice Fields in Illinois Central remain 
largely controlling.131 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See 152 U.S. 1, 11–12, 14–15 (1894) (discussing the King’s sovereignty over submerged lands 
for the public’s use and benefit under English law and the continuation of this tradition through the 
colonies to the states). 
 124 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452–
55. 
 125 Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 481. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See PPL Mont. LLC., v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 580 (2012) (representing the only opinion by 
sitting members of the Court referencing the PTD as of this Note’s publication). 
 129 Id. at 580, 603–04. 
 130 See id. at 603–04 (discussing the PTD in dicta). Unfortunately, the Court, in dicta, meant to 
express the deference given states in interpreting their PTDs but not the equal-footing doctrine, and 
the Court reiterated questionable precedent describing the PTD as state law. Id. at 603. But see Blumm 
& Schaffer, supra note 20, at 409 (arguing that this precedent does not make the PTD inapplicable to 
the federal government). 
 131 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 402 (referring to Illinois Central as the lodestar PTD 
case, using the term coined by Professor Joseph Sax, Sax, supra note 66, at 489). 
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B. The Public Trust Doctrine at the State Level 
In comparison, the PTD has developed more decidedly at the state lev-
el.132 The majority of states have cited Illinois Central in describing their own 
doctrines, with many of those seemingly recognizing it as a binding statement 
of federal law.133 Many, however, have gone beyond the scope of the tradition-
al doctrine, most prevalently by expanding the protected public uses to include 
recreation.134 Others have treated it even more progressively, expanding the 
protected values to include environmental protection or openly describing their 
PTDs as adaptive or evolving to meet the changing needs of their people.135 
Where states have so expanded their PTDs, they have done so in recognition of 
the perennial value of the state’s resources to the public.136 
For example, in the 1995 case Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Association, 
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether an agency decision to 
permit private construction of a series of docks violated the PTD.137 In finding 
that the permit neither conveyed interest in trust resources nor would substan-
tially impair them, the court described the PTD beneficiary interest as an “inal-
ienable right.”138 Many states have gone beyond common law and have ex-
pressly incorporated the PTD into their constitutions or into the public rights 
they protect.139 Hawaii, the state with the most progressive PTD, for instance, 
declares in its constitution that the state “shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s 
natural beauty and all natural resources” for all generations.140 The Hawaii Su-
preme Court considered this language, amongst several other supporting provi-
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 484 (“We see no reason to disturb the general proposi-
tion that the law of real property is . . . left to the individual states to develop and administer.”); East-
ern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 11 (outlining ways in which the states can expand upon the tradi-
tional PTD). 
 133 Chase, supra note 20, at 151. 
 134 Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 11. 
 135 Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 846–50; Western States’ Public Trust, supra 
note 18, at 83–84. 
 136 See Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 21, at 846–50 (describing states that anticipate 
their PTD evolving alongside public values); see, e.g., State v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 
1130 (Vt. 1990) (describing the PTD as “molded and extended to meet the changing conditions and 
needs of the public it was created to benefit”) (quoting Matthews Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 
A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984)). 
 137 456 S.E.2d 397, 399, 402 (S.C. 1995) (holding that permitting dock construction would not 
violate the PTD). 
 138 Id. 
 139 E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 13–15; HAW CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XX, 
§ 21; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 4; see Eastern Pub-
lic Trust, supra note 17, at 26–113 (describing the PTD for each eastern state); Western States’ Public 
Trust, supra note 18, at 93–197 (describing the PTD for each western state). 
 140 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; see Western States’ Public Trust, supra note 18, at 58, 71 (describ-
ing the breadth of Hawaii’s PTD compared to other states). 
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sions of the state constitution, in In re Water Use Permit Application.141 In in-
terpreting this language, it found that the state’s PTD applied to both surface 
and ground water and kept both within the state’s sovereign authority.142 
That case raises another interesting development of the American PTD, 
namely that it lies inherent in the sovereignty of states, so subverting the PTD, 
accordingly, undermines the state’s sovereignty.143 This conclusion draws sup-
port from the doctrine’s centuries of common law persistence, but judicial 
opinions also urge this conclusion.144 Most notably, the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the PTD, particularly in the doctrine’s development alongside the 
equal-footing doctrine in the nineteenth century, implies its fundamental tie to 
sovereign power.145 As the Illinois Central Court declared, “such property is 
held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public.”146 Many 
state courts also maintain that the PTD involves innate elements of sovereign-
ty.147 For example, in Parks v. Cooper, the South Dakota Supreme Court stat-
ed, quite plainly, that tradition established the PTD as “an inherent attribute of 
sovereign authority.”148 There the court contemplated title to new lakes formed 
by flooding on private property.149 It found that the PTD existed independent 
of any positive law and held that the doctrine required the sovereign state to 
protect use of those waters for the public.150 
Under this view, if the several states are sovereigns and if the federal gov-
ernment represents a sovereign nation, then each must accept and uphold its fi-
                                                                                                                           
 141 9 P.3d 409, 442 (Haw. 2000). 
 142 Id. at 447 (considering the apportionment of water from a ditch-system containing both fresh 
surface water and groundwater to private irrigation and natural streams). 
 143 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 411, 419 (describing the PTD as inherent in sover-
eignty and part of the state’s reserved powers). 
 144 Id.; see Wilkins, supra note 23, at 429 (discussing the PTD’s heritage). 
 145 See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 223 (describing the sovereign’s trust responsibilities in outlining the 
equal-footing doctrine); Martin, 41 U.S. at 416 (describing the sovereign’s responsibilities over lands 
vested with the public interests). 
 146 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 455; see also Martin, 41 U.S. at 416 (explaining that the obligations and 
responsibilities of the English government vested in the state when the people assumed the sovereign 
power); id. at 420 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (explaining that the power vested in the state is the jus 
regium, the power to regulate for the benefit of the people, and asserting that this obligation prohibits 
divesting complete control in public resources and thus depriving the people of a “common right”). 
 147 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 419; see, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 
F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (saying neither the federal nor state governments can convey trust 
lands free of the sovereign’s jus publicum); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 
199 (Ariz. 1999) (saying the PTD is a constitutional limitation on legislature); In re Water Use Permit 
Application, 9 P.3d at 443 (saying history has established the PTD as inherent in sovereign authority); 
Lawrence v. Clarke Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (saying the PTD arises from inherent limi-
tations on state power); Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (saying 
PTD rights are preserved rather than created by the state constitution). 
 148 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004). 
 149 Id. at 824. 
 150 Id. at 838–39. 
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duciary relationship towards its people and manage the resources held in trust for 
their benefit.151 This means that the individual sovereigns that comprise the 
United States, as fiduciaries, each must manage the navigable-in-fact and tidally 
effected waters within their jurisdiction as well as any additional resources that 
their respective constitutional, statutory, or common laws have recognized as 
held in trust.152 Nevertheless, despite how powerful these statements may seem, 
establishing the PTD as inherent in sovereign authority still leaves unresolved 
how the various branches of government should apply it as a legal concept.153 
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND DUE PROCESS 
Recognizing the public’s beneficiary interest as a due process protected 
fundamental right would help guide the PTD’s treatment by the separate powers 
of government and would build on the dual notions that the doctrine lies inherent 
in sovereignty and that sovereign states must fulfill their trustee obligations.154 
Several points support the argument that sovereigns should treat the PTD as a 
matter of due process: first, the PTD’s longstanding tradition and treatment by 
courts as a source of standing suggests that it qualifies as a protected property 
interest; second, the PTD’s similarity to the police power suggests that it would 
fit well within due process jurisprudence; and third, viewing the PTD as a matter 
of due process accords with its judicial treatment to date.155 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine’s History Makes Its Beneficiary Interest a 
Protected Property Right 
The PTD’s beneficiary interest should qualify as a protected property 
right because individual members of the public can reasonably expect the sov-
ereign to respect it, making the PTD, if not a core property interest, at least an 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 457–58, 460 (saying the state holds title to trust resources for the 
public); Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 418 (saying states as sovereigns have an obligation to 
protect trust resources for the present and future public). 
 152 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 418 (saying sovereigns have a duty to protect trust 
resources); see, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) 
(saying neither the federal nor state governments can convey trust lands free of the sovereign’s jus 
publicum); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) (saying the 
PTD is a constitutional limitation on legislature); In re Water Use Permit Application, 9 P.3d at 443 
(saying history has established the PTD as inherent in sovereign authority); Lawrence v. Clarke Cnty, 
254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (saying the PTD arises from inherent limitations on state power); Rob-
inson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (saying PTD rights are preserved 
rather than created by the state constitution). 
 153 See infra notes 212–251 and accompanying text. Cf. Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 412 
(explaining that because the PTD is inherent in sovereignty, the Tenth Amendment’s reserved-powers 
doctrine embodies it in the federal constitution but not discussing the implication of this conclusion on 
application). 
 154 See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text; infra notes 219–251 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 156–209 and accompanying text. 
1340 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1321 
entitlement.156 To qualify as a protected interest under entitlement theory, the 
existing law must so limit the governing body’s discretion toward a particular 
interest that an individual can reasonably expect a certain treatment or out-
come.157 When dealing with statutes or regulations, courts look for explicit 
textual language in the law obliging administrators in certain circumstances to 
conduct themselves a specific way.158 Akin to this analysis, when identifying 
fundamental liberty interests that merit protection, courts look to tradition and 
the nation’s history to identify those interests that Americans recognize as vital 
to their pursuit of happiness.159 Together, these suggest that the basis for enti-
tlements to property for a primarily common law doctrine like the PTD would 
have to come from limitations placed on official discretion by precedent pro-
tected by stare decisis.160 
The individual sense of entitlement derived from precedent should, logi-
cally, become stronger and more reasonable the more enduring and uniform the 
judicial statements of law.161 The numerous examples of courts applying shifts 
in the common law prospectively, rather than in the at-hand case, demonstrates 
the judiciary’s respect for such reasonable expectations of the public.162 Fair-
ness urges against holding people retrospectively responsible for conduct that 
accorded with the law at the time of the actions because people tend to tailor 
their conduct to the bounds of the law.163 They have expectations in the state of 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (finding no liberty interest 
because regulations did not create a reasonable expectation); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (saying that a legitimate claim of entitlement, not a unilateral expectation 
creates a property interest). 
 157 See Ky. Dep’t of Corrs., 490 U.S. at 462 (saying that law creates a liberty interest by placing 
limits on official discretion); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (saying that existing rules and understandings 
create property interests when they support claims of entitlement). 
 158 See Ky. Dep’t of Corrs., 490 U.S. at 462–63 (reviewing prison regulations for language creat-
ing liberty interests). 
 159 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967). 
 160 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (saying that the Constitution protects an interest because that in-
terest is rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (saying that claims of 
entitlement come from existing understandings of law); see also Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[T]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judi-
cial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”). 
 161 See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text. 
 162 E.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (holding that to apply a new standard 
of jury instructions retroactively violates due process); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 
1327 (Mass. 1984) (holding that the statutory term “person” includes viable fetuses but applying the 
change prospectively); Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1320 (Mass. 1977) (holding that 
the first statement within the jurisdiction of a particular standard at common law should only be ap-
plied prospectively). 
 163 See Marks, 430 U.S. at 191–92 (saying that the principles of the Ex Post Facto Clause apply to 
the judiciary as a matter of due process liberty). 
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the law, and the legal system respects their expectations by requiring fair warn-
ing before a change.164 Due process protects such expectations.165 
With the PTD, even though it has evolved and expanded since its incep-
tion in American law, its fundamental statement in the 1892 Supreme Court 
case Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, has remained relatively static for 
over a century and that statement itself builds on half a millennia of English 
common law.166 This longstanding precedent further portrays the PTD as in-
herent in sovereignty and accordingly irrevocable.167 As an inherent and irrev-
ocable element of sovereignty that has persisted since the Nation’s inception, 
courts should view the PTD as an enduring aspect of the Nation’s history and 
tradition and find expectations that a government adhere to the PTD as reason-
able.168 
The eminence of the Illinois Central opinion also makes it possible to 
look for explicit language cordoning state discretion as entitlement theory 
would require.169 That opinion states that the trust “requires” the government 
to preserve its waters, that the legislature “must” use its powers to execute its 
trust obligations, and that the state “cannot” fully abdicate control over the 
trust.170 Strong language pervades the opinion all to the effect that the state has 
an obligation to uphold its trust responsibilities, therefore limiting and direct-
ing its use of discretion towards trust resources.171 
Finally, when a proposed government action threatens public access or use 
of a protected resource, some courts have treated the PTD as presumptive 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See id. (saying that fair notice of what amounts to criminal conduct is a matter of constitution-
al liberty). 
 165 Id. at 192 (requiring fair notice of changes in the law as a matter of due process). 
 166 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892); Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, 
at 9; see supra notes 78–134 and accompanying text. 
 167 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 455–56; Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 418; see Coquillette, 
supra note 23, at 801; Wilkins, supra note 23, at 429. 
 168 See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. Additionally, Justice Fields in Illinois Cen-
tral quotes an earlier state opinion, which the Martin v. Waddell Court similarly relied upon, that 
describes the public interest in state waters as a common right. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 456 (“The sover-
eign power, itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the con-
stitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the State, divest-
ing all the citizens of their common right.”) (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Halsted, 1, 13 (N.J. 1821)); 
Martin, 415 U.S. at 419. In the alternative, as a right with deep foundation in American tradition, the 
PTD beneficiary interest may also satisfy the Supreme Court’s test applied to the incorporation of 
liberty interests into due process. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (de-
scribing fundamental liberty interests as those embedded in the nation’s history and tradition). 
 169 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452; Chase, supra note 20, at 150; see Ky. Dep’t of Corrs., 490 U.S. at 
462–63 (reviewing prison regulations for explicit language creating a liberty interest). 
 170 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452, 454, 460. 
 171 See id. (describing the state’s trustee responsibilities as mandatory and prohibiting complete 
divestiture of control). 
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grounds for standing for any member of the public.172 Such treatment suggests 
that courts already see the beneficiary interest as an entitlement.173 Building on 
this and respecting the obligations imposed on sovereigns by the PTD’s persis-
tent precedent, courts should take the next step and acknowledge the PTD’s ben-
eficiary interest as an entitled property interest.174 Such an acknowledgement 
would push the PTD squarely within the broad jurisprudence of due process.175 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine’s Similarity to the Police Power 
Shifting the focus to the states, the PTD’s similarity to the police power 
suggests that, like the police power, sovereign states should treat the PTD as a 
matter of due process.176 Both concepts predate American or even English 
law.177 The police power stems from the authority described in the Justinian 
Institutes as jus regium, or the authority of the sovereign to legislate for the 
welfare of the people.178 Under both Roman and English law, the jus publicae, 
or public law, from which the PTD stems, subjugated this sovereign power.179 
The police power and PTD also both emerge from the relationship between the 
state and its governed people, so they speak directly to how a particular state 
understands the concept of sovereignty.180 The concept of the police power 
first appeared in American jurisprudence in Gibbons v. Ogden, when Chief 
Justice Marshall in resolving control over navigation rights, described the re-
sidual powers retained by the states.181 In Illinois Central, which itself drew on 
navigation and federalism precedent, Justice Fields used an analogy to the po-
lice power to describe the PTD, asserting that a state could no more abdicate 
its trust responsibilities than it could abdicate its police powers.182 This paints 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n., 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970); Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 
17, 19. 
 173 See Paepcke, 263 N.E.2d at 18 (describing the PTD as grounds for standing); Turnipseed, 
supra note 21, at 17, 19 (describing the PTD as presumptive grounds for standing). 
 174 See supra notes 151–152, 156–172 and accompanying text. 
 175 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (indicating that deprivations of property require due 
process) Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (indicating that entitlement property interests come from preexisting 
law). 
 176 See infra notes 177–191 and accompanying text. 
 177 Patalano, supra note 42, at 702; see Coquillette, supra note 23, at 801 (describing the PTD’s 
origins in Roman law). 
 178 Patalano, supra note 42, at 705. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See Byrne, supra note 66, at 917 (saying the PTD can provide an alternative to the police 
power); Hilla, supra note 37, at 99 (discussing sovereignty as understood by John Locke—granted in 
limited form by consent of the people to serve the people). 
 181 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 50 (1824). 
 182 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. 
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both the PTD and police power as inherent attributes of sovereignty and 
sources of authority to govern for the people.183 
Although both doctrines grew as sources of authority for state action, 
simultaneously, they both limit its power when the public welfare or good of 
the state requires.184 Both cordon the state’s exercise of its sovereign powers to 
the appropriate purposes and means identified by their respective jurispru-
dence.185 In reviewing an exercise of the police power, a court will first look to 
see if the act serves a proper public purpose, or, less deferentially, a compelling 
public interest.186 Then, it will look to whether the chosen means rationally 
relates to that end, with the level of scrutiny depending on the interest at 
stake.187 Similarly, in reviewing an action relating to public trust resources, a 
court will consider the purpose, asking if the action serves the trustee’s obliga-
tions of preserving intergenerational public use and access to the resource.188 
In reviewing the rationality of that action, a court will ask if it promotes the 
public interests in the resource or at least does not substantially impair those 
interests.189 
Based on these standards, the levels of scrutiny applied in reviewing an 
exercise of the police power or the public trust differ, but the review asks es-
sentially the same questions.190 They both seek to stave off capricious govern-
ment action that violates the obligations inherent in the state’s sovereignty by 
considering the purposes, means, and various public and private interests at 
stake.191 Due process restrains government action in just this way.192 The case 
law establishes that a review for proper exercise of the police power often falls 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See id. (portraying the police power and PTD as analogous obligations of the state to the peo-
ple). 
 184 See infra notes 185–192 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (saying due process requires that regulations serve 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (saying the PTD requires 
alienations of trust resources to serve or not substantially impair the public interest). 
 186 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (saying that it requires a compelling public pur-
pose to infringe a fundamental right); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969) 
(saying statutes generally only need a rational basis); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 (saying exercises must 
be justified by a proper public purpose). 
 187 See United States v. Carolene Prods., Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that depri-
vation of certain interests requires a higher level of scrutiny). 
 188 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 17. 
 189 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 190 Compare Carolene Prods., Inc., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (discussing the level of deference given 
exercise of the police power and the higher scrutiny given when abridging fundamental rights), with 
Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (explaining when a state can alienate its trust responsibilities). 
 191 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 411 (describing the police power and due process as 
inherent in sovereignty); Ely, supra note 25, at 324 (saying due process protects against arbitrary 
government action); Plater & Norine, supra note 8, at 709 (describing means end analysis); Sax, supra 
note 66, at 488–89 (describing the PTD as a restraint on the states). 
 192 See Ely, supra note 25, at 320, 338 (saying due process requires a rational nexus between a 
government’s means and its desired ends). 
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under due process.193 Therefore, based on the similarities between the police 
power and the PTD, due process should also provide the framework for review 
of a state’s public trust obligations.194 
C. A Due Process Public Trust Doctrine Fits with Existing Precedent 
Furthermore, viewing the PTD as a matter of due process would not upset 
its common law tradition.195 The leading federal case, Illinois Central, and two 
notable state cases, Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth 
and National Audubon v. Superior Court (“Mono Lake”) demonstrate how a 
due process PTD fits within existing precedent.196 In Illinois Central, the Court 
stated that the legislature’s earlier grant of a large section of Chicago’s harbor 
to the private railroad violated its trust obligations to retain control and manage 
that resource for the public’s access and use.197 Hypothetically infusing this 
holding with due process language, the legislature arbitrarily or capriciously 
exercised its sovereign power over the lake and lakeshore because the grant 
would inhibit its ability to protect the public interests in the property.198 Thus, 
the Court used the PTD as the law of the land to outline the perimeter of ac-
ceptable exercises of sovereign authority and invalidated the legislative grant 
for overstepping it.199 
In Boston Waterfront, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court consid-
ered whether a statutory grant permitting a private corporation to build 
wharves into Boston Harbor below the low water mark conveyed fee simple 
absolute title to the land below the wharves.200 After reciting a thorough histo-
ry of the shore law of Massachusetts from its colonial founding to the present, 
the court found that the statute did grant fee simple title but on the condition 
that the grant continue to serve the public purpose that initially induced the 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540, 542 (2005) (identifying reasona-
bleness review of the police power as a due process review); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397 (identifying 
zoning regulations that serve a valid public purpose as a proper exercise of the police power under due 
process). 
 194 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 411 (comparing the PTD and police power); supra 
notes 178–193 and accompanying text. 
 195 See infra notes 196–209 and accompanying text. 
 196 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 433; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 
709, 711 (Cal. 1983); Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Mass. 
1979); see infra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
 197 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 460. 
 198 See id.; supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 460; supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 200 393 N.E.2d at 358. If due process does protect the public trust beneficiary interest, then the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that states hold lands submerged under tidal and navigable water in 
trust calls the position of Massachusetts, which extends private ownership to the mean low tide line, 
into question. See Fernandez, supra note 100, at 655–56 (questioning Massachusetts’s continued ad-
herence to the colonial ordinance of 1647). 
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legislation.201 The state held these lands in trust for the public, so it could only 
grant title to serve a public purpose, and the land’s use had to continue to serve 
the grant’s original public purpose because the land remained subject to the 
public trust after the grant.202 To phrase this as a due process analysis, the pub-
lic trust requires a heightened public purpose that accounts for intergeneration-
al public interests in the property, therefore a grant of fee simple absolute title 
abolishing those interests would be an irrational means of achieving the public 
end.203 On the other hand, a grant with the condition subsequent that it contin-
ues to serve its public purpose would rationally promote that end and accord-
ingly satisfy due process.204 
In Mono Lake, the California Supreme Court reviewed the City of Los 
Angeles’s decision to withdraw water from mountain streams feeding an eco-
logically unique salt lake.205 The court, initially, recognized the lake as a public 
trust resource based on its ecological and scenic value, which put the state’s 
prior appropriation law and the PTD in direct conflict.206 The court then held 
that the state had an obligation to consider its public trust obligations in allo-
cating its water resources and ordered a study to determine the impact of water 
withdrawal on the lake.207 Applying it as a demonstration of a due process 
PTD, because the court recognized the lake as a trust resource, the state had to 
reconcile its actions with the public purpose requirements of the PTD.208 Not 
doing so would be arbitrary or capricious action, thus the court ordered a study 
to clarify the reasoning of the state.209 
These examples demonstrate that reinterpreting the PTD as a matter of 
due process would not undermine the existing precedent.210 Further, the endur-
ance and fundamental recognition of the PTD’s beneficiary interest and the 
doctrine’s role as both a source and stricture on sovereign power complimen-
tary to the police power suggest that courts should treat it as such.211 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Bos. Waterfront, 393 N.E.2d at 367. 
 202 Id. at 366–67. 
 203 See id. (holding that grants of trust resources included the public purpose as a condition subse-
quent); supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 204 See Bos. Waterfront, 393 N.E.2d at 367 (requiring continued support of the public purpose as a 
condition subsequent); supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 205 658 P.2d at 711. 
 206 Id. at 712, 727. California water use law incorporates common law appropriation, which al-
lows private parties to appropriate and divert natural water channels under certain circumstances. Id. 
at 724. Of the fifty states, California carries one of the most expansive PTDs. See Western States Pub-
lic Trust, supra note 18, at 83. 
 207 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728. 
 208 Id.; see supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 209 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 729 (requiring consideration of the PTD’s environmental protec-
tions); supra notes 30–65 and accompanying text. 
 210 See supra notes 196–209 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra notes 156–193 and accompanying text. 
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V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF A DUE PROCESS PROTECTED  
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Some may argue that understanding the PTD as a condition of due pro-
cess would unnecessarily expand due process or undermine the PTD’s protec-
tions.212 But understanding the PTD through due process does not change the 
obligations or rights the doctrine creates and would ease, rather than perplex 
the judicial role.213 Individual members of the public would retain an interest 
in access and use of designated resources, and the state would remain obligated 
to act as trustee of those resources to promote the public interests of present 
and future generations.214 The doctrine, however, would now have a constitu-
tional foundation, and courts could review both police power and public trust 
exercises of authority through the same analysis.215 This would simplify judi-
cial review of both legislative and administrative action, ease some of the con-
fusion in takings law, and provide a framework for the ongoing debate regard-
ing the PTD’s scope.216 
A. Applying the Due Process Protected Public Trust Doctrine to  
Review of Government Action 
As with exercises of the police power, people could challenge legislative 
and administrative action involving the trust.217 Such statutory or regulatory 
challenges would proceed along the same lines whether under the PTD or po-
lice power.218 The standards of scrutiny applied would simply change when a 
government decision involves property held in trust.219 First, a court would ask 
if the state has sovereignty over the property in question, and secondly, if the 
public trust burdens the property.220 Thirdly, if the property were a public trust 
resource, then a court would ask if the state undertook its action to serve the 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
extension of due process into substantive realms); Coquillette, supra note 23, at 811–12 (arguing 
against reducing the PTD to an administrative law). 
 213 See infra notes 214–252 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (discussing the public’s interest in 
access and use); Byrne, supra note 66, at 916 (discussing the trustee’s obligations); Turnipseed, supra 
note 21, at 17–18 (discussing the intergenerational public interest). 
 215 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring due process prior to deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property); infra notes 218–224 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 219–267 and accompanying text. 
 217 See supra notes 185–193 and accompanying text. 
 218 See supra notes 185–190 and accompanying text. 
 219 Compare Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (determining proper public purpose by whether it pro-
motes or does not substantially impairing the public’s interest in access and use), with Euclid v. Am-
bler, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (determining proper public purpose by deciding if it substantially re-
lates to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare). 
 220 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 433–35, 452 (describing the property at issue and identifying it as a 
trust resource). 
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proper public purpose of intergenerational use and access.221 Alternatively, if 
the property were not a trust resource, the court would ask if the state under-
took its action to serve another standard of proper public purpose, such as pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or general welfare.222 Finally, the court would ask if 
the means chosen rationally relate to that proper purpose.223 If dealing with a 
trust resource, meeting this rationality requirement would require the action 
either to promote or not substantially impair public interests in the resource.224 
If not dealing with a trust resource, then the court would either require the def-
erential rational connection generally given to state exercises of the police 
power or the higher standard applied to fundamental liberty interests.225 
In administrative law, courts tend to give agencies considerable deference 
in interpreting and executing their statutory mandates.226 Many statutes include 
explicit language conveying trust obligations, but for those that do not, such 
deference theoretically could conflict with proper PTD due process review as 
described.227 But, understanding the PTD as grounded in the due process 
clause also facilitates its use as a canon of construction, similar to the canon 
against constitutional conflict.228 This would in turn allow courts to incorporate 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See id. at 453 (saying trust resources can only be alienated if doing so advances or does not 
impair the public’s interest); Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 17–18 (discussing the intergenerational 
public interest). 
 222 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (saying regulation of property that serves a proper public purpose 
is not arbitrary or capricious). 
 223 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (asserting reasonable regulations 
do not violate due process). 
 224 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (asserting the trustee can alienate trust property if it properly 
protects the public interest). 
 225 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny review to a regula-
tion inhibiting abortion); United States v. Carolene Prods., Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (applying a 
deferential standard of review to a regulation interfering with commerce of “filled milk”); W. Coast 
Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 (applying a deferential standard of review to a regulation interfering with the 
right to contract). 
 226 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (saying courts should 
give agencies deference in interpreting statutes they enforce). 
 227 E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(f) (2016) (saying that the federal government and states “shall act on behalf of the public as 
trustee of such natural resources”). A due process PTD would infuse PTD trustee obligations and their 
associated limitations of government discretion with the review process, thus narrowing what would 
qualify as a reasonable interpretation under Chevron. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 842–43 (indicating that 
courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable statutory interpretations). 
 228 See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (stating that when possi-
ble, courts should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional doubt); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452–53 (dis-
cussing the PTD obligations and interests); Canon of Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (“A rule used in construing legal instruments . . . .”); Araiza, supra note 19, at 697 (present-
ing the PTD as a canon of statutory construction). Backing the PTD with the Constitution and ground-
ing it in the familiar terms of due process would make it easier to identify potentially conflicting statu-
tory interpretations. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 697 (outlining how to use the PTD as a cannon of 
statutory construction). 
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respect for the interests and obligations of the PTD into the various forms of 
administrative review.229 
Recent court decisions and responding commenters have also begun to 
debate statutory displacement of the PTD.230 Some assert that, because the 
PTD comes from common law, statutes that speak directly to the issue displace 
it as a cause of action.231 Others reiterate that the PTD lies inherent in sover-
eignty, so legislative law could fulfill public trust obligations but cannot dis-
place them.232 Understanding the PTD as incorporated in due process helps 
clarify this debate.233 Because due process constitutionally protects PTD bene-
ficiary interests and obligates the sovereign as trustee, a state cannot abrogate 
its responsibilities through statutory displacement without causing a depriva-
tion of property.234 But, should the state choose to fulfill its trustee responsibil-
ities by legislation, a court would still likely dismiss a general PTD challenge 
for failure to state a claim.235 The state has acted as trustee, but possibly arbi-
trarily or capriciously.236 In that scenario, a claim that the state has not fulfilled 
its responsibilities as trustee should actually come as a statutory challenge, as-
serting the inadequacy of the statute as a violation of a due process protected 
property interest.237 
                                                                                                                           
 229 E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (describing the appropriate way to review agency interpre-
tations of administered statutes); see Araiza, supra note 19, at 697 (describing use of the PTD as a 
canon of statutory interpretation). 
 230 E.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that the Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671, preempts the PTD as applied to the atmosphere); Blumm & Schaffer, 
supra note 20, at 418 (arguing that statutes cannot displace the PTD); Schaffer, supra note 70, at 174–
75 (arguing that Alec L. mistakenly found preemption). 
 231 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16. 
 232 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 418. 
 233 See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 234 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 411, 418–19 (arguing 
that states cannot displace the PTD without breaching their responsibilities as sovereigns). 
 235 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (allowing states to collect natural resource damages as trustee for the 
public); Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (finding federal statute preempted a PTD for climate change). 
 236 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (stating that regulations can affect proper-
ty interests but not in an arbitrary or capricious manner). 
 237 See supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text. Another interesting aspect of the PTD, it 
imposes affirmative obligations on the sovereign, so it not only limits discretion in acting but also in 
choosing when not to act. See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n., 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970) (saying 
members of the public do not have to await government action to have standing). As such, an individ-
ual or group could choose to challenge government inaction as a violation of their due process pro-
tected beneficiary interest. See id. But without affirmative statements from the court or legislature that 
the resource at risk falls within the corpus of the trust, such suits would pose challenges to plaintiffs. 
See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156014, at 5 (D. 
Or. Nov. 10, 2016) (deciding that plaintiffs cannot use the PTD to force affirmative action in combat 
of climate change). 
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B. The Due Process Public Trust Doctrine and the Takings Clause 
Because the PTD involves a balance of public rights, private rights, and 
sovereign authority, it also finds its way into eminent domain and regulatory 
takings cases.238 Viewing the PTD as a matter of due process simplifies both 
such proceedings.239 In the regulatory takings context, the PTD represents the 
public interest weighed against the private burden of the regulation.240 In this 
sense, some scholars have even described it as immune from takings claims.241 
As Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth demonstrates, this 
idea stems from the PTD notion that when the state alienates trust property to 
private holders for the public benefit, the act does not squelch the public inter-
est.242 Instead, the public interest persists in the form of an access easement or 
condition subsequent.243 Whatever burdens a regulation imposes lessen when 
the private party lacks absolute title, especially when lacking the right to ex-
clude.244 Thus, a court is unlikely to see the burden as a taking when weighed 
against the strong public interest in trust resources.245 The public interest per-
sists because it is a right, which, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 865 (1987) (deciding the constitu-
tionality of land use exactions and mentioning the PTD in dissent); United States v. 32.42 Acres of 
Land, 683 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2012) (deciding the federal government’s ability to take state 
trust land in eminent domain); Palazzolo v. State (Palazzolo II), No. WM 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. 
LEXIS 108, at 48–56 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) (deciding that the PTD weighed heavily against 
finding a regulatory taking), on remand from Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001). 
 239 See infra notes 240–253 and accompanying text. 
 240 See Palazzolo II, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at 48–56 (using the PTD as part of regulatory 
takings analysis). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo effectively opened the 
door for such use of the PTD. See 533 U.S. at 633–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying the fac-
tors considered in regulatory takings analysis). In brief terms, whether a regulation affects a taking or 
not involves balancing a number of factors surrounding the burden imposed on the private property 
owner by the regulation. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(indicating that takings analysis involves considering economic impact on the property owner, their 
investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action). 
 241 Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36, at 332 (describing regulation of trust resources as immune 
from takings claims). 
 242 See 393 N.E.2d 356, 366–67 (Mass. 1979) (finding that the obligation to serve the public in-
terest survives grant of title). 
 243 See id. (finding that the public interest persists as a condition subsequent). 
 244 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (saying it is reasonable to weigh public 
and private interests in permitting property development); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 
781, 787, 791 (Wis. 2001) (describing the right to exclude as the hallmark of property rights but say-
ing the PTD reduces its weight). 
 245 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing against invalidating an inhibi-
tion of private property rights done in the public’s interest); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
48 (1960) (saying impact on private property rights as a consequence of serving the public may not 
effect a taking). 
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legislatures and regulators can regulate or restrict in service of the public good 
but cannot entirely abrogate.246 
In the eminent domain context, the PTD could finds its way into proceed-
ings in three different ways.247 First, if the state takes a large plot of trust prop-
erty previously granted, according to Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 
that grant was necessarily revocable, so reacquisition of that property by the 
state may not qualify as a taking.248 Second, if dealing with a smaller plot of 
trust property, the weight of the enduring public interest would reduce what the 
state owes as just compensation for taking the private owner’s remaining prop-
erty rights.249 Third, if the federal government takes state land, the state’s trus-
tee responsibilities should pass to the federal government.250 Whether transfer-
ring title in trust property from state to private owner, from private owner to 
state, or from state to federal government, in each scenario, characterizing the 
public’s beneficiary interest as a protected right explains why it persists.251 
That the PTD persists, subsequently affects the fair value of the title trans-
ferred, speaking to just compensation.252 Regardless of how one views the rela-
tionship between the takings and due process clauses, when public trust re-
sources stand at issue, understanding the beneficiary interest as a fundamental 
right helps simplify the analysis.253 
The Blackmun papers reveal that Justice Brennan’s position in the 1986 
case Nollan v. California Coastal Commission would have benefited from such 
an understanding.254 In analyzing the access easement conditioning the at-issue 
permit in that case, Justice Brennan originally wanted to explain in his dissent 
that title to shore land comes burdened with the public interest.255 He saw this 
as weighing against any imposition of private rights amounting to a taking, 
                                                                                                                           
 246 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; see Byrne, supra note 66, at 917 
(saying the PTD affects what qualifies as valid legislation of property rights). 
 247 See infra notes 247–249 and accompanying text. 
 248 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 455 (saying that enduring trustee obligations make any grant of trust 
property revocable). 
 249 See Palazzolo II, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at 48–56 (using the PTD in regulatory takings 
analysis and saying it limits investment-backed expectations). 
 250 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 455 (implying that trustee obligations survive divestiture); Bos. 
Waterfront, 393 N.E.2d at 366–7 (implying that trustee obligations survive divestiture). But cf. 34.42 
Acres of Land, 683 F.3d at 1039 n.2 (holding that the state public trust did not pass to the federal gov-
ernment when it took state land through eminent domain but leaving in place the district court conclu-
sion that a federal trust arose in those areas that remained tidelands). 
 251 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453; see Byrne, supra note 66, at 917 
(saying the PTD affects what qualifies as valid legislation of property rights). 
 252 See Palazzolo II, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at 48 (finding that the PTD mitigated the eco-
nomic impact a regulation had on private property). 
 253 See supra notes 238–252 and accompanying text. 
 254 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14 (using the PTD to argue that requiring an access easement 
was neither a taking nor unreasonable). 
 255 Id. 
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particularly an optional condition as that case involved.256 Alternatively, any 
government act done for the PTD beneficiary interest inexorably qualifies as a 
valid public purpose, and any regulation or condition that promotes that pur-
pose, such as securing an access easement, qualifies as a rational exercise of 
sovereign power.257 As a condition, a public access easement would certainly 
serve the trustee’s purpose of guaranteeing use and access of the shore.258 
C. The Scope of the Due Process Public Trust Doctrine’s Corpus 
Nollan involved the California PTD, which, though still restricted to wa-
ter resources, has expanded to protect traditional uses, recreation, and ecolo-
gy.259 Understanding the PTD as under due process would also affect how 
courts treat this contentious aspect of the doctrine, the scope of the trust’s cor-
pus.260 The country would continue to manage fifty-one different public trusts, 
but the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Illinois Central and Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Mississippi would set a minimum threshold guaranteed by the 
federal Constitution.261 Like all fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme 
Court, the federal Constitution would invalidate any efforts by states to ignore 
or subvert that right.262 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s statements that 
property rights and the scope of their PTDs remain largely with the states, 
states would still hold the authority to expand or alter their trusts, provided 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that public access was a legiti-
mate purpose and an easement a reasonable means); Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14 (using the PTD to 
reinforce his position). 
 257 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14 (using the PTD to justify a permitting condition). 
 258 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (describing the public access easement permitting condition at 
issue); Brennan, supra note 1, at 1–14 (using the PTD to demonstrate the rationality of a permitting 
condition). 
 259 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (discussing access to coastal lands); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Su-
perior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (expanding the California public trust to 
include ecological resources); Western States’ Public Trust, supra note 18, at 71 (discussing expan-
sion of the California PTD). 
 260 See infra notes 261–267 and accompanying text. 
 261 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 481 (1988) (saying the PTD protects 
lands under navigable waters and lands affected by the tides); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (saying the 
state holds title to certain resources as a trustee for the public); Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 
402 (calling it a mistake to consider the PTD purely a matter of state law); Chase, supra note 20, at 
150 (saying the federal PTD represents a minimum threshold); Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 
3, 5 (calling it a mistake to reduce the fifty state PTDs into a single doctrine and saying the federal 
PTD sets a minimum standard for the states). 
 262 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state law subverting the right to 
marry); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (invalidating a state law subverting parent’s 
right to control the education of their children). Only Idaho has tried to abdicate its trustee responsibil-
ities fully, but the Supreme Court invalidated this attempt. Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 
261, 283 (1997); Schaffer, supra note 70, at 176. 
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they uphold this federal minimum.263 In California, where the state’s highest 
court has recognized ecological uses within its PTD, citizens have a protected 
right to expect that the state will account for the ecological value of water re-
sources in developing regulations.264 Likewise, in the multitude of states that 
recognize recreation as a PTD protected use, the public’s protected property 
interest in trust resources includes that right.265 
Where states have incorporated the traditional public trust into their state 
constitutions, that enumeration stands as a pronouncement of the pre-existing, 
fundamental right guaranteed by the PTD.266 Where states have incorporated 
expanded trusts, they establish a due process protected property interest in 
each citizen in the expanded corpus of that trust.267 
CONCLUSION 
Following its reemergence in late twentieth century legal writing, the pub-
lic trust doctrine (“PTD”) has the potential to be a powerful tool for environ-
mental lawyers. It protects the public’s right to use and access vital natural re-
sources by placing them in trust with the sovereign and guiding the sovereign’s 
discretion in their management. Even though it lies inherent in sovereignty, the 
positive law of the country spatters it across constitutional, statutory, and 
common law sources. Its effectiveness suffers from this undefined foundation. 
The unfortunate omission of the doctrine from Nollan v. California Coastal 
and the resulting incoherence surrounding exactions-takings jurisprudence 
stands as just one example of this weakness. 
Understanding the PTD’s beneficiary interest as a due process protected 
property right helps resolve these failings. The U.S. Constitution requires due 
process of all state action that deprives “life, liberty, or property,” guaranteeing 
that arbitrary or capricious governance will not interfere with these rights. Be-
cause the state’s trusteeship under the PTD comes inherent in its sovereignty, it 
follows that individual members of the public can expect their beneficiary in-
terests as rights deserving such protection. This argument draws support fore-
most from the enduring history of the doctrine, which starts in the Justinian 
Institutes of Rome, continues through twenty-first century law, and embeds in 
the tradition of the American legal system. It garners further support, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 263 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012); see Eastern Public Trust, supra note 
17, at 5 (saying when states expand their PTD, they generally do so above the federal minimum). 
 264 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719 (recognizing the public interest in ecological resources). 
 265 See Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 11 (describing access for recreation as the most 
common PTD expansion). 
 266 See supra notes 139, 174–175 and accompanying text. 
 267 See Eastern Public Trust, supra note 17, at 5, 11 (describing ways states expand their trusts); 
see, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (protecting “Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources”); 
S.C. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 4 (protecting rivers and navigable waters). 
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from the similarity between the PTD and the police power—another ancient 
concept—and the PTD’s agreement with existing precedent. 
Rather than muddling doctrines and perplexing judicial review, viewing 
the PTD as a matter of due process should help clarify its application. This un-
derstanding would allow courts to review actions by the sovereign trustee un-
der the familiar framework of due process and to invoke it with the confidence 
a constitutional foundation allows. Such a framework should subsequently se-
cure the sovereign responsibilities that the PTD calls for and give the public 
both a clear basis for standing and a legal platform from which they can chal-
lenge actions by the trustee. Treating the PTD as a matter of constitutional due 
process should comprehensively improve its efficacy as a doctrine and allow it 
to emerge as the bedrock of environmental law that it could be. 
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